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bankrupt firms are more keen to manage financial statements in comparison with their non-bankrupt 
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time and sectors. Using proxies of sale and production cost manipulation, the results highlight 
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used differently in each sector and across the time period investigated.  
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Introduction 
 
Due to economic crisis situations, there is an increasing trend to financial distressed 
companies that may enter in the bankruptcy procedure and go to liquidation. The latter 
situation provokes huge economic, labour and social losses (Wu 2010). Indeed, the 
failure of a company has implications on many stakeholders such as employees, who 
lose their jobs; supplier companies, which might be significantly affected in the case the 
bankrupt firm is one of their main customers; creditors and lenders, who could not 
receive their money; government, which has to bear some of the social and welfare 
costs in addition to losses in terms of less taxation incomes due to the higher 
unemployment rate.  
 
In this context, managers may feel under pressure and have incentives to take decisions 
in order to avoid or postpone firms’ bankruptcy procedure. It is not unusual that some of 
those actions might include some kind of accounting manipulation strategies as have 
been demonstrated from previous literature. For example, Barth et al. (2008) suggest 
that earnings management is regarded as a tool that managers use to their own interests 
and Smith et al. (2001) provide empirical evidence that failing companies manipulate 
earnings more than healthy ones using income increasing accounting techniques. In 
bankruptcy situations, earnings manipulation might also lead to serious legal 
consequences as managers who intentionally alter the actual firm’s financial 
performance might face the payment of a fine or even be sentenced to prison in case of 
ascertained frauds. 
 
Bearing all these things in mind, analysing a matched sample of bankrupt and healthy 
unlisted companies from Spain, this paper has three main objectives: the first one is to 
demonstrate that bankrupt firms are more keen to manage financial statements in 
comparison with their non-bankrupt pairs during the years preceding the bankruptcy; it 
then investigates when bankrupt firms begin to manage their earnings and the practices 
they use to do that; finally it provides empirical evidence of bankrupt firms’ earnings 
manipulation pattern across time and sectors. Using two proxies of real activities 
manipulation (manipulation of sales and manipulation of production costs), the results 
highlight more pervasive earnings manipulation practices among Spanish bankrupt 
2 
 
firms in comparison with healthy ones. These practices start at least four years before 
the beginning of the legal procedure. In addition, findings indicate that sale and cost 
manipulation are used differently in each sector and across the time period investigated, 
with interesting evidence of no sale manipulation the last year before filing for 
insolvency. 
 
This research makes several interesting contributions to the extant literature. It 
investigates the earnings manipulation among bankrupt firms using for the first time, to 
the best of our knowledge, a code law institutional setting – Spain – totally different 
from Anglo-Saxon countries already analysing from previous studies. It is well known 
that institutional setting affects earnings management pervasiveness (Leuz et al. 2003) 
so we are adding a new approach to the literature. Hence, Spain is an interesting context 
because it is one of the most hit European countries by the financial crisis occurred in 
Europe at the time of the preparation of this study, particularly due to the lack of 
financial funding (BBVA Group 2012) and it is one of the most relevant countries 
within the European Union (EU) as it is the 5th largest in terms of GDP in 2011 (IMF)i.  
Moreover, the sample focuses exclusively on non-listed companies. Although no 
previous study totally concentrates on this segment of the economy probably because of 
the difficult data access, their relevance is indeed out of discussion as they represent 
99.6% of Spanish companies and contribute to 60% of Spanish GDP (Eurostat 2011). 
Unlisted companies also characterise the majority of EU economy given that they 
account for more than 75% of European GPD (Ecoda 2010) and it is empirically 
demonstrated the, during financial crisis, insolvency problems are more critical among 
for these firms (Lussier and Halabi 2010). Additionally, this paper uses real activities 
manipulation proxies as it is tested that the majority of earnings management results 
from manipulating real transactions (Graham et al. 2005). This methodology is also 
suitable for bankrupt firms as it can separate manipulation of revenues from that of 
costs. Finally, it also reaches a very high level of detail, highlighting the trend, in each 
industry, with reference to the earnings manipulation methods used in a particular point 
in time before the bankruptcy procedure. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on 
earnings management among bankrupt firms, the context of our research and presents 
the research questions. Section 3 details the sample selection procedure and describes 
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the methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and section 5 concludes this 
research highlighting its main implications and limitations. 
 
2. Background and research questions 
 
2.1 Earnings management in non-healthy firms 
 
Most of the earnings management literature has been analysed in presence of many 
disparate incentives that may stimulate managers to carry out accounting 
misbehaviours. There is evidence of earnings management in order to beat analysts’ 
forecast and/or to achieve zero earnings surprise (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, Lee 
et al. 2006), meet debt covenant (e.g. DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994, Jaggi and Lee 
2002), increase bonus-related salary (e.g. Healy 1985, Shuto 2007), reduce taxation 
liabilities (e.g. Keating and Zimmerman 2000, Goncharov and Zimmermann 2006), 
decrease regulatory bodies’ intervention (e.g. Jones 1991, Key 1997), taking advantages 
of favourable IPO or equity issues (e.g. Friedlan 1994, DuCharme et al. 2004). In 
addition to that, pressure brought by poor results or extreme financial situations could 
also amplify the use of accounting manipulation in order to alter actual firms’ 
performance. Hence, evidence indicates that companies experiencing financial distress 
exhibit higher level of earnings management (e.g. Ohlson 1980, Beneish and Press 
1995, Rosner 2003, García Lara et al. 2009). Economic crises further exacerbate these 
practices: on the one hand, they are seen as ‘ideal’ condition for managers in order to 
manipulate earnings downwards (e.g. ‘big bath’ or ‘cookie jar’ earnings manipulation 
strategies) and blame the economy for this situation (e.g De Angelo et al. 1994, Smith 
2001, Saleh and Ahmed 2005); on the other hand, managers might also need to 
overcome adverse performance managing earnings upwards in order to avoid filing for a 
legal procedure. Most countries in the world set up a procedure, commonly in Court, 
usually called bankruptcyii, to manage and solve financial problems of firms that are on 
the brink of financial ruin. This procedure mainly relies on information gathered from 
troubled firms’ annual reports that, as previously explained, have more incentives than 
healthy companies to manipulate them. Taking into account that high-quality earnings 
are essential for fair market valuations (Gaio and Raposo 2011) and rational 
stakeholders’ decisions (Xu et al. 2007), earnings manipulation among bankrupt firms is 
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a relevant topic to research. Indeed, although the increasing trend in earnings 
management research area (DeFond 2010), literature related to the impact of earnings 
manipulation on bankrupt companies is relatively scarce (Balcaen and Ooghe 2006). 
The papers investigating earnings management among non-healthy firms which include 
a direct comparison with healthy pairs are reported in the Table 1. 
 
From the analysis of the literature, several gaps may be highlighted. Firstly, it is worth 
noting that prior studies investigate only countries under an Anglo-Saxon institutional 
setting. It is well-known that institutional factors affect earnings management practices 
and Leuz et al. (2003) indicate that earnings management decreases in the level of legal 
protection afforded investors by countries’ legal systems. Moreover, the factors that 
create incentives for earnings management may be different for these environments 
(Burgstahler et al. 2006), and ‘some results of Anglo-Saxon studies may not hold in non 
Anglo-Saxon countries’ (Vander Bauwhede and Willekens 2000, p.190). In addition, 
depending on the country, the bankruptcy procedure has different consequences 
(LaPorta et al. 1998, Claessens and Klapper 2005). So the analysis of also a code law 
institutional setting would be crucial as the merely extension of the extant evidence to 
this type of countries does not seem to be the best option. Finally, with the only 
exception of Kallunki and Martikainen (1999), previous studies only focus on listed 
companies, probably because of the easier availability of financial information, although 
empirical evidence shows that unlisted firms exhibit higher levels of earnings 
management and have different incentives for doing that (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). 
For these reasons, we decide to move the focus on a code law country, Spain, and non-
listed companies.  
 
Previous literature is then quite ‘ambiguous’ in the criteria used to define a firm as ‘non-
healthy’. Half of the studies reviewed use the ‘legal’ meaning of bankruptcy but others 
consider a company ‘unsuccessful’ or ‘failed’ on the basis of different economic 
variables such as total market return to investors (Lilien et al. 1998) or negative working 
capital and losses during a period of time (Rosner 2003).  On the other hand, other 
papers choose selection criteria provided by commercial database that usually do not 
give as result only real bankrupt firms.   This  could  be  the  case  of  Garcia  Lara  et  
al. (2009)  which  use the ‘inactive company’ criterion on  FAME  database  or  Beneish 
et al. (2012) which  employ  the  ‘technical default’ criterion  on   Compustat   database. 
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We exclusively focus on firms which actually went on bankruptcy. In general, the 
managers’ behaviours would not be the same if the company is near to ‘disappear’ due 
to a merger or a voluntary liquidation than to file for bankruptcy. In many cases the 
latter is almost a ‘death sentence’ for the companies and they have many and different 
issues to deal with in comparison with other firmsiii. This idea explains why, in case of 
bankruptcy, manager’s behaviour is going to be supervised by a Court in detail. 
Furthermore, based on real bankrupt firms entered into the legal procedure, our study 
has important implications because of the legal and, more importantly, criminal 
consequences indicated in the Spanish legal framework in relation to bankruptcy. 
Indeed, managers could be sentenced to jail if it is demonstrated that they have 
manipulated earnings opportunistically in their own benefits (Art. 261, Spanish 
Criminal Code)iv. 
 
The evolution of the methodology from prior literature indicates that the first studies on 
earnings management among bankrupt firms investigate the effect of changes in 
accounting policies and use only descriptive and univariate statistics (Lilien et al. 1988, 
Smith et al. 2001). Later, basic definitions of accruals are employed (Rosner 2003, 
Charitou et al. 2007) while the latest papers use multivariate analyses and more 
developed accrual models (Jones 2011, Beneish et al. 2012). However, there is 
empirical evidence that demonstrates that real activities manipulation is relatively 
commonplace in presence of earnings management incentives (Roychowdhury 2006). 
Only Garcia Lara et al. (2009) use sale manipulation although using unlisted and listed 
companies together. In our study we want to investigate whether managers of bankrupt 
non-listed firms manipulate real transactions more than other companies. As evidence 
suggests that receivables and inventory are the most frequently managed accounts 
(Rosner 2003), both sale and production cost manipulation will be investigated. 
 
As far as the main findings are concerned, all the papers analysed in Table 1 suggest 
that managers of non-healthy firms manipulate earnings upwards approaching the 
failure of the company with the exception of only two (Charitou et al. 2007, Leah and 
Newsom 2007) which reach the opposite conclusion. However, there are no exhaustive 
results in relation to when earnings manipulation occurs in bankrupt firms. Rosner 
(2003) suggests that this misbehaviour begins one year prior to bankruptcy-filing; Leah 
and Newsom (2007) find upwards earnings manipulation five years and downwards in 
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the two years prior to filing; Garcia Lara et al. (2009) observe upwards earnings 
management at least in the four years prior the failure while Beneish et al. (2012) find 
earnings manipulation two years before the default but fail to detect the same practices 
the year prior the failure. Finally, as there is no clear evidence about the trend of 
earnings manipulation practices across sectors and the combination of time and 
industries, we aim to extend our investigation also to these scenarios. 
 
Bearing all this in mind, our research questions may be stated as follows: 
RQ1: Do bankrupt firms in Spain manipulate earnings more than healthy ones? 
RQ2: When do bankrupt firms in Spain manipulate earnings? 
RQ3: How do earnings manipulation practices change across sectors? 
RQ4: How do earnings manipulation practices change across years in different 
sectors?  
 
2.2 The context of the research: Spain 
 
Our literature review (see Table 1) indicates that extant research is scarce and 
completely focused on common law countries. As LaPorta et al. (1998) suggest that 
evidence from common law countries cannot be extended to contexts with a different 
legal tradition, our paper constitutes the first investigation of earnings management 
among bankruptcy firms in a civil-law context. Indeed, Spain is considered a code law 
country because its legal system has its roots in the French legal tradition (LaPorta et al. 
1997, Spamann 2010) in the same way as other similar code law European countries 
such as France, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal. Accordingly, 
previous research agrees that a country's legal setting also influences the financial 
reporting system (Saudagaran and Meek 1997, Archambault and Archambault 2003, 
Soderstrom and Sun 2007) and Schultz and Lopez (2001) point out that accounting 
judgments vary significantly across nations. They also advise that “national culture 
interacts with findings accepted as general within behavioural decision research”. Also 
Doupnik and Salter (1995) suggest that the legal system is an institutional indicator that 
influences both how accounting rules are promulgated and their content while LaPorta 
et al. (1998) find that common law countries have better accounting systems than code 
law counterparts. Prior IFRS adoption, Spanish accounting was strongly influenced by 
fiscal legislation, bank equity finance and prudence but those characteristics are still 
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present for unlisted companies that still accounts under local GAAP. Indeed, although 
Spanish accounting standards for unlisted companies have been modified in 2007 in 
order to incorporate some of the IASB accounting concepts and eliminate alternative 
accounting methods as this should lead to improvements in accounting quality (Barth et 
al. 2008), they are not significantly different from their prior version. 
 
National bankruptcy laws are also very important to analyse as it is verified that they 
condition the development of financial market (Levine 1998), the development of 
national entrepreneurship (Lee et al. 2011) and are crucial for investments in a country 
(Pindado et al. 2008). Indeed, there is evidence that demonstrates that the Spanish 
insolvency legislation blocks start-ups initiatives (Celentani et al. 2010), which instead 
might help during recession time. As the bankruptcy code and the efficiency of its 
enforceability determine the final outcome of the process (Wang 2012), the analysis of 
the legal environment is relevant.  
 
The law governing the bankruptcy procedure in Spain is the Act on Insolvency (Ley 
Concursal) LC 22/2003 dated 9th July, which came into effect in 2004. This was an 
important change in the Spanish regulation as this law substituted two more complex 
legal procedures (liquidation and suspension of payment), one of them issued more than 
one century ago.  
 
The bankruptcy procedure begins with the declaration of insolvency from a Judge. 
Creditors (compulsory bankruptcy) or managers (voluntary bankruptcy) may go to the 
Mercantile Court and request the filing for bankruptcy when firms present liabilities 
disproportionately larger than assets and/or chronically suffer from large accumulated 
losses (Xu and Wang 2009). The most common type of bankruptcy is the voluntary as 
managers can continue to run the company. Indeed, in case of financial problems, 
managers prefer starting the procedure themselves in order to avoid any creditors’ legal 
action which would lead to the compulsory bankruptcy. In the latter case, the managers 
are removed from the company’s board and are substituted by mercantile administrators 
appointed by the Judge.  
 
Some national insolvency laws provide a preventative mechanism for negotiation 
between interested parties before the beginning of the bankruptcy procedure. These 
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negotiations are designed to determine whether the firm possesses a going-concern 
value (Denning et al. 2001). In Spain, as in Italy and Finland, this special procedure 
intended to avoid bankruptcy is called ‘preconcursal’ and stops any creditor claim and 
aims to reorganize the firm within four months. A firm is eligible for ‘preconcursal’ if it 
proves to be solvent and it is only temporarily unable to meet its financial obligations. 
Consequently, a quick reorganization agreement would save managers from entering the 
bankruptcy process and its related consequences including time delay, costs and the 
dissolution of the business at the end of a time-consuming process.  
 
Once the legal procedure begins, there is a first period where lawyers, economists and 
other parties appointed by a Judge analyse the economic and financial situation of the 
company. This is called ‘common phase’. Results from this process determine if a 
company is fit for a going concern agreement, in other words reorganization, or 
liquidation. Once the Court decides that a company is solvent, firms and creditors can 
negotiate the terms of reorganizationv; on the contrary, if the Court assesses that the 
firms is not solvent, the company goes to liquidation. The purpose of reorganization is 
to preserve the business and allow firms staying on the market. The purpose of 
liquidation is to sell firms’ assets to satisfy the creditors as much as possible. The 
procedure finishes when the Court requests have been all met. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample selection 
 
This paper uses data extracted from the webpage ‘www.registroconcursal.es’ which 
provides us with the name and the fiscal number of all the bankrupt companies in the 
twelve Commercial Justice Courts in the region of Madrid. The initial data set includes 
all the unlisted companies in the bankruptcy process in Madrid from May to June 2010 
which total 1,387 during this period of timevi. Using firms’ fiscal number, financial and 
accounting information has been obtained from SABI database, a database provided by 
Bureau Van Dijk that includes comprehensive information of more than 940,000 
companies operating in Spain. From the latter database a control sample of healthy 
firms has been also extracted. Firms have been matched on the basis of the industry in 
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which they operatevii, the legal formviii and years. We group the companies into four 
industries – ‘Construction’, ‘Industrial’, ‘Services’ and ‘Wholesalers’ – on the basis of 
the NSI (National Statistics Institute) classification. In line with previous studies that 
use real activities manipulation methodology (e.g. Garcia Lara et al. 2009), we aim to 
analyse earnings management practices between the first and the fourth year before the 
beginning of the legal procedure for bankruptcy. For this reason, we excluded all firms 
without an adequate time series of data together with their pairs. At the end of this 
process, the sample counts 362 bankrupt firms and 362 healthy firms over a four-year 
period for a total of 2,896 firm-year observations.  
 
3.2 Real Activities Manipulation 
 
In this paper, we analyse earnings management through the impact of real activities 
manipulation in post-bankrupt and continuing firms. As previously explained, we use 
this dimension of earning management because of its fundamental importance as 
documented by Graham et al. (2005) which concludes that earnings management is not 
only widely practiced, but that the majority of earnings management results from 
manipulating real transactions. In addition, compared to research that investigates 
accruals-based earnings management, studies on real activities management are scarce 
(DeFond 2010) so we also extend this branch of literature on failed unlisted companies 
operating in a code law country. Following the methodology introduced by 
Roychowdhury (2006), we focus on sale and production cost manipulation as they 
usually are the most significant accounts in a firm’s annual report and receivables and 
inventory are the most frequently managed items (Ricci 2011). All variables used in this 
paper are explained in Table 2. 
 
3.2.1 Sale manipulation 
 
First of all, we analyse sale manipulation estimating the following cross-sectional 
regression (1), in line with Garcia Lara et al. (2009), separately for each of the four 
industries investigated to calculate the normal level of cash flow given reported sales. 
 
CFOit/At-1 = α + β1(1/ASSETSit-1) + β2(SALESit/ASSETSit-1) +  
+ β3(ΔSALESit/ASSETSit-1) + εit    (1) 
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For each firm, abnormal cash flow (ABNCFO) is obtained by subtracting the actual 
CFO from the ‘normal’ CFO calculated using the estimated coefficients from the above 
equation (1). 
 
Table 2. Variable description and measurement 
 
 
ABNCFO Is a proxy for sale manipulation.  
ABNPROD Is a proxy for production cost manipulation. 
SALES Total sales of the company. 
ASSETS Total assets of the company. 
CFO Cash flows from operation. 
PROD Total production costs: cost of goods sold plus change in inventory. 
Size Is the natural logarithm of the total assets. 
NetIncome Is net income scaled by beginning-of-year total assets. 
BKRP Is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for bankrupt firms and 0 for 
the healthy ones. 
 
 
3.2.2 Production cost manipulation 
 
The manipulation of production costs is analysed by the following model (2) which, in 
accordance with Roychowdhury (2006), is used to estimate the normal level of 
production costs (PROD), defined by the sum of the cost of goods sold and change in 
inventory. The model is estimated separately for each of the four industries investigated. 
 
PRODit/ASSETSit-1 = α + β1(1/ASSETSit-1) + β2(SALESit/ASSETSit-1) + 
+ β3(ΔSALESit/ASSETSit-1) + β 4(ΔSALESit-1/ASSETSit-1) + εit  (2) 
 
Abnormal production costs (ABNPROD) are then the difference between actual costs 
and the ‘normal’ level of expenses resulting from the use of the estimated coefficients 
from equation (2). 
 
ANBCFO and ABNPROD are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th percentile to avoid that 
our findings might be biased due to the presence of outliers. 
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Model (3), in line with Roychowdhury (2006) methodology, is finally estimated for 
gathering evidence related to our proposed research questions: 
 
Yit = α + β1Sizeit + β2NetIncomeit + β3BKRPit + εit   (3) 
 
Where Y is, in turn, ABNCFO and ABNPROD. 
 
In the hypothesis that bankrupt firms manage earnings upwards the years before the 
legal failure, we would observe β3 to be negative and significant when the dependent 
variable is ABNCFO. Indeed, it would be consistent with an abnormally low level of 
cash flow, given reported sales, among bankrupt firms probably due to sale 
manipulation, e.g. fictitious sales, abnormal discounts or more lenient credit terms. In 
the same hypothesis of upwards earnings management, we would also find β3 to be 
significantly positive when the dependent variable is ABNPROD. Indeed, it would 
indicate that bankrupt firms exhibit higher production costs as result of an increase of 
the level of production which lowers fixed costs per unit with a consequent decrease of 
the cost of goods sold and an increase of the operating margin. 
 
Model (3) is first calculated for the entire sample (including years and industries 
dummies) in order to investigate whether, on average, non-listed bankrupt firms, in 
Spain, are more likely to manipulate earnings through sales and production costs than 
healthy firms the years before the actual bankruptcy.  We then run model (3) separately 
for each year preceding the actual beginning of the legal procedure (including industries 
dummies) and for each industry considered (including years dummies) to analyse 
whether, on average, the choice of earnings manipulation practices among Spanish 
bankrupt firms depends on the number of years preceding the bankruptcy procedure 
and/or the sector in which they operate. Finally, the model is estimated for the 
combination of sectors and years to highlight any trend, in each industry, with reference 
to the earnings manipulation methods used in a particular point in time. 
 
All regression models explained above are estimated using OLS with robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. 
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4. Results and discussion 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analyses 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in our model (3) as well as 
total sales and assets. The latter variables aim to provide information about the 
dimension of the firms investigated. They are presented separately for bankrupt and 
healthy firms. Statistical significance of the differences in mean, median and standard 
deviations between the two groups of firms is also reported.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive Analysis: bankrupt and healthy companies 
 
 Bankrupt Companies Healthy Companies 
 N. Mean Median St. Dev N. Mean Median St. Dev 
ABNCFO 1,448 0.071 0.070 0.521 1,448 0.201*** 0.140*** 0.458 
ABNPROD 1,448 0.039 -0.014 0.222 1,448 -0.044*** -0.050*** 0.204** 
Size 1,448 14.723 14.483 1.623 1,448 14.116*** 13.945*** 1.898*** 
NetIncome 1,448 -0.053 0.006 0.362 1,448 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.342*** 
Assets 1,448 10,613,656 1,949,649 28,698,110 1,448 8,871,553* 1,138,260*** 25,268,874 
Sales 1,448 7,123,263 2,264,620 15,295,127 1,448 7,422,940 937,137*** 21,564,350 
 
 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, two-tailed, of differences 
between mean, medians and standard deviation between firms which are and firms which are 
not controlled by listed companies. 
For variable definitions, see Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2 provides evidence that ABNCFO among firms which started a legal procedure 
for bankruptcy (0.071) is significantly lower than that observed for the group of healthy 
firms (0.201) at the 1% level. This result indicates an abnormally lower level of cash 
flows from operation given reported sales among bankrupt firms that can be the result 
of sale manipulation in order to increase net income fictitiously. Consistently, the 
variable ABNPROD equals 0.039 among bankrupt companies while it measures -0.044 
for healthy firms with a difference which is significant at the 1% level. As previously 
explained, higher level of production costs can be used from troubled firms to lowering 
fixed costs per unit with a consequent decrease in the cost of goods sold and a 
corresponding increase in the operating margin. This income increasing outcome is in 
line with most of prior literature but, using proxies of sale and production cost 
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manipulation, not previously used at the same time on this topic, we have here evidence 
that managers manipulate earnings upwards using sales and production costs jointly. 
 
The logarithm of total asset among the former group (14.72) is higher than the same 
figure among the latter (14.12), evidence that healthy firms are, on average, smaller. 
This result is in line with Carter and Van Auken (2006) who corroborate that size has no 
bearing on failure. Finally, bankrupt firms show, on average, a negative income against 
a profit reported by healthy firms. The total assets average around 10.5 million for 
bankrupt firms and 9 million among the healthy pairs. The level of sales is similar 
between the two groups of firms (with an average of around 7 million), but it could be 
due to the presence of potential sales manipulation highlighted above.  
 
4.2 Multivariate analyses 
 
4.2.1 Correlation analysis 
 
We report correlation matrix in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
*, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level or better, 
two-tailed.  For variable definitions, see Table 2.  
 
 
Table 4 supports the main results provided by our descriptive statistics and univariate 
analyses. It shows a negative association between bankrupt firms and ABNCFO (p-
value = 0.000) which indicates a lower cash flow given the level of sales among this 
group of companies. The latter exhibits also a positive relation (p-value = 0.000) with 
ABNPROD, evidence of higher production costs than their healthy pairs and a negative 
BKRP ABNCFO ABNPROD Size NetIncome
BKRP
ABNCFO ‐0.132***
ABNPROD 0.190*** ‐0.194***
Size 0.169*** 0.044** ‐0.040**
NetIncome ‐0.113*** 0.143*** ‐0.558*** 0.048***
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and significant coefficient with the variable NetIncome (p-value = 0.000) indicating that 
bankrupt companies report lower profits in their income statement. 
 
4.2.2 Regression analysis 
 
We start our regression analyses presenting the results of our models for earnings 
management estimated for the entire sample. These are reported in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5. Bankrupt firms and real earnings management 
 
 (A) (B) 
 ABNCFO ABNPROD 
INTERCEPT -0.154 0.020 
 (0.108) (0.048) 
Size 0.015* -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.003) 
NetIncome 0.197* -0.327*** 
 (0.112) (0.065) 
BKRP -0.117*** 0.058*** 
 (0.022) (0.012) 
Observations 2,896 2,896 
R-squared 0.187 0.332 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
 
Notes: 
P-values calculated from firm-level clustered standard errors which appear in parenthesis below the 
coefficient estimate. *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level or better.  
  
Regression models: 
Col. A: ABNCFOt = α + β1Sizeit + β2NetIncomeit + β3BKRPit + εit 
Col. B: ABNPRODt = α + β1Sizeit + β2NetIncomeit + β3BKRPit + εit 
For variable definitions see Table 2. 
 
 
 
Findings fully support previous literature (e.g. Rosner 2003, Garcia Lara et al. 2009) 
that bankrupt firms manipulate earnings upwards more than healthy companies before 
the actual bankruptcy begins. In addition, it is consistent across our two measures of 
real activities manipulation supporting the evidence from our descriptive statistics that 
upwards earnings management is achieved using a combination of sale and cost 
manipulation. Indeed, in column A, results from model (3) with ABNCFO as dependent 
variable are presented. The model is strongly significant (p-value = 0.000) so is the 
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negative coefficient β3 (β = -0.117; p-value = 0.000) which indicates that bankrupt firms 
show abnormally lower cash flow compared to the other group of firms, given reported 
sales. This might be evidence of sale manipulation, using for example unusual 
discounts, extension to credit terms, premature and/or fictitious sales recognition, etc. 
Column B re-estimate model (3) using ABNPROD as dependent variable. The 
significance of the model is strong (p-value = 0.000) and the coefficient β3 is positive 
and significant (β = 0.058; p-value = 0.000), indicating that bankrupt firms exhibit 
higher production costs as result of an increase in the level of production which lowers 
fixed costs per unit with a consequent decrease of the cost of goods sold and an increase 
of the operating margin compared to the healthy ones. Both this evidence is consistent 
with Rosner (2003) which reaches the same conclusion using a different methodology 
with a different institutional setting and sample (USA and listed companies). 
 
4.2.2.1 Bankrupt firms and real activities manipulation across years 
 
To better frame our research and understand when it is more likely that earnings 
management occurs among bankrupt firms, Table 6 presents the estimation of our 
models separately for each year investigated. Earnings manipulation is analysed starting 
from the fourth year before the legal procedure to the year immediately before this 
situation. 
 
Interesting evidence comes from Table 6. First of all, it suggests that, earnings 
management, using both sale and cost manipulation, starts at least four years before the 
actual bankruptcy procedure, in accordance with the evidence observed by Garcia Lara 
et al. (2009) in relation to UK companies. In addition, Table 6 shows that our earnings 
management practices investigated are not used consistently across the years. In 
particular, bankrupt entities manage real sales before the actual bankruptcy but, 
accordingly with Kallunki and Martikainen (1999), it does not happen the year 
immediately before the legal procedure.  This might be due to the fact that it is too late 
to manage this kind of transactions which involve third parties, such as customers, or 
because the level of control from external bodies increases so the manipulation of sales 
could be more easily discovered; it could also motivated by the time-period covered 
which clashes with an economic crisis that makes sale manipulation more complicated 
to achieve. On the other hand, bankrupt firms manage production costs over the entire 
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period investigated, as evidenced by the positive and strongly significant coefficients 
from model (3) when ABNPROD is used as dependent variable. This provides evidence 
that, despite aware of the serious legal consequences, managers never stop to 
manipulate earnings before filing for bankruptcy and, even when some strategies 
become impracticable (see sale manipulation in year t-1), they find other methods to do 
that.  
 
Overall, our results suggest that the number of years preceding the bankruptcy affects 
the way management manipulate earnings. 
 
Table 6. Bankrupt firms and real earnings management (analysis by year). Table reports 
only the coefficients of interest. 
 
 
  (A) (B) 
  ABNCFO ABNPROD 
 BKRP -0.179*** 0.068*** 
Year -4  (0.037) (0.015) 
    
 Observations 724 724 
 R-squared 
Industry Dummies 
0.128 
Yes 
0.248 
Yes 
 BKRP -0.121*** 0.032*** 
Year -3  (0.334) (0.015) 
    
 Observations 724 724 
 R-squared 
Industry Dummies 
0.136 
Yes 
0.322 
Yes 
 BKRP -0.102*** 0.027** 
Year -2  (0.031) (0.013) 
    
 Observations 724 724 
 R-squared 
Industry Dummies 
0.242 
Yes 
0.349 
Yes 
 BKRP -0.009 0.087*** 
Year -1  (0.029) (0.024) 
    
 Observations 724 724 
 R-squared 
Industry Dummies 
0.382 
Yes 
0.441 
Yes 
 
Notes: 
P-values calculated from firm-level clustered standard errors which appear in parenthesis below the 
coefficient estimate. *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level or better.   
 
Regression models: 
Col. A: ABNCFOt = α + β1Sizeit + β2NetIncomeit + β3BKRPit + εit 
Col. B: ABNPRODt = α + β1Sizeit + β2NetIncomeit + β3BKRPit + εit 
For variable definitions see Table 2. 
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4.2.2.2 Bankrupt firms and real activities manipulation across industries 
 
Although earnings management practices can be affected by the sector in which firms 
operate (Gaio 2010) because of the different nature of revenues and costs, none of the 
previous research has investigated that among non-healthy firms. Indeed, the analysis of 
a relation between earnings management practices and industry can be relevant to the 
public interest in order to locate the areas of the financial statement that might need a 
closer analysis in case of suspicious activities or failure problems. For this reason, we 
present our models separately for each of the four sectors analysed in the following 
Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Bankrupt firms and real earnings management (analysis by industry). Table 
reports only the coefficients of interest. 
 
 
  (A) (B) 
  ABNCFO ABNPROD 
 BKRP -0.038* 0.046*** 
Construction  (0.028) (0.015) 
    
 Observations 812 812 
 R-squared 
Years Dummies 
0.024 
Yes 
0.507 
Yes 
 BKRP -0.156*** 0.057*** 
Industrial  (0.027) (0.017) 
    
 Observations 812 812 
 R-squared 
Years Dummies 
0.055 
Yes 
0.381 
Yes 
 BKRP -0.131** 0.100*** 
Service  (0.062) (0.026) 
    
 Observations 784 784 
 R-squared 
Years Dummies 
0.118 
Yes 
0.357 
Yes 
 BKRP -0.079*** -0.026 
Wholesalers  (0.019) (0.031) 
    
 Observations 488 488 
 R-squared 
Years Dummies 
0.082 
Yes 
0.308 
Yes 
 
Notes: 
P-values calculated from firm-level clustered standard errors which appear in parenthesis below the 
coefficient estimate. *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level or better.  
  
Regression models: 
Col. A: ABNCFOt = α + β1Sizeit + β2NetIncomeit + β3BKRPit + εit 
Col. B: ABNPRODt = α + β1Sizeit + β2NetIncomeit + β3BKRPit + εit 
For variable definitions see Table 2. 
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Table 7 suggests that companies operating in different sectors use different approaches 
in order to manipulate earnings. Companies operating in the construction industry are 
more likely to use, on average, production cost manipulation, given the higher 
significance of the related coefficient (β = 0.046; p-value = 0.003). One possible 
explanation for that might be found to a drop in demand and the ‘real estate bubble’ at 
the time the sample was referred: this context of recession makes sales more difficult to 
manipulate. Moreover, accounting cost recognition choices and difficulties in the 
calculation of the cost of the goods sold in this sector give managers more opportunities 
to use this kind of earnings manipulation. 
 
Firms which focus their business on the industrial sector use both sale (β = -0.156; p-
value = 0.000) and production cost (β = 0.057; p-value = 0.001) manipulation in order 
to conceal firms’ real performance. In this case, managers have more options to alter 
both revenues and costs as the market did not observe significant contractions during 
the period analysed. 
 
Bankrupt services firms mainly use production costs as tool of earnings management (β 
= 0.100; p-value = 0.000), especially because it is the easiest way for them given the 
difficulties in reliable checks of this kind of costs. There is also a weaker evidence that 
they manage real sales (β = -0.131; p-value = 0.035). This trend could be explained by 
the presence, in these companies, of many intangible components that are difficult to 
observe reliably, such as hours worked, type and quality of services provided. 
 
Finally, wholesalers that went for a bankruptcy procedure obfuscate their real financial 
performance only using sale manipulation (β = -0.079; p-value = 0.000) while there is 
no evidence of the use of production cost manipulation (β = -0.026; p-value = 0.411). 
The latter situation could be explained by the fact that wholesaler are not involved in 
any (significant) production activity as they mainly act as intermediate traders buying 
goods from producer, selling them, without any (significant) industrial transformation, 
to other firms or to final customers.  
 
4.2.2.3 Bankrupt firms and real activities manipulation across years and industries 
 
Having established that the way distressed firms manage financial statement differs 
depending on the sector in which they operate and the number of years preceding the 
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beginning of the bankruptcy procedure, in the following analyses we investigate, with a 
very high level of detail, whether and how firms operating in each of the four sectors 
considered manage financial numbers in each of the four years preceding the legal 
procedure for bankruptcy. 
We start our analysis from the construction industry and report the results in Table 8 
below. 
 
Table 8. Bankrupt firms and real earnings management (Construction sector by year). Table 
reports only the coefficients of interest. 
 
  (A) (B) 
  ABNCFO ABNPROD 
 BKRP -0.126** 0.056*** 
Year -4  (0.058) (0.020) 
    
 Observations 203 203 
 R-squared 0.040 0.486 
 BKRP -0.041 0.008 
Year -3  (0.050) (0.017) 
    
 Observations 203 203 
 R-squared 0.043 0.498 
 BKRP 0.041 0.028* 
Year -2  (0.049) (0.017) 
    
 Observations 203 203 
 R-squared 0.036 0.580 
 BKRP 0.001 0.061*** 
Year -1  (0.054) (0.017) 
    
 Observations 203 203 
 R-squared 0.031 0.671 
 
Notes: 
P-values calculated from firm-level clustered standard errors which appear in parenthesis below the 
coefficient estimate. *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level or better.   
 
Regression models: 
Col. A: ABNCFOt = α + β1Sizeit + β2NetIncomeit + β3BKRPit + εit 
Col. B: ABNPRODt = α + β1Sizeit + β2NetIncomeit + β3BKRPit + εit 
For variable definitions see Table 2. 
 
Consistently with Table 7, findings show that construction firms mainly use the 
manipulation of production costs in order to mislead stakeholders from the firm’s real 
financial performance. Indeed signs of this type of manipulation are found in three out 
of the four years analysed. They also manipulate sales but only the fourth year before 
the legal procedure begins. The reason of this evidence could be attributed to the fact 
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that we consider firms in bankruptcy in 2010, so years from t-3 to t-1 clash with the 
serious crisis in the construction industry which Spain observed during this period. A 
significant drop of houses’ prices due to the construction’s bubble, together with an 
increase of the level of regulators’ control, probably made sale manipulation difficult to 
use. In this situation, construction companies tried to postpone their failure focusing on 
cost manipulation which is particularly marked especially at the end of the life of the 
companies (β = 0.061; p-value = 0.000). This is, for these firms, the easiest way to alter 
their financial performance as the ‘last attempt’ to avoid the bankruptcy procedure. 
 
Results pertaining to the industrial sector are reported in Table 9. 
 
 
Table 9. Bankrupt firms and real earnings management (Industrial sector by year). 
Table reports only the coefficients of interest. 
 
  (A) (B) 
  ABNCFO ABNPROD 
 BKRP -0.173*** 0.056*** 
Year -4  (0.054) (0.022) 
    
 Observations 203 203 
 R-squared 0.054 0.332 
 BKRP -0.140*** 0.022 
Year -3  (0.047) (0.023) 
    
 Observations 203 203 
 R-squared 0.184 0.486 
 BKRP -0.161*** 0.007 
Year -2  (0.052) (0.017) 
    
 Observations 203 203 
 R-squared 0.054 0.465 
 BKRP -0.053 0.048** 
Year -1  (0.047) (0.027) 
    
 Observations 203 203 
 R-squared 0.211 0.631 
 
Notes: 
P-values calculated from firm-level clustered standard errors which appear in parenthesis below the 
coefficient estimate. *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level or better.   
 
 
Regression models: 
Col. A: ABNCFOt = α + β1Sizeit + β2NetIncomeit + β3BKRPit + εit 
Col. B: ABNPRODt = α + β1Sizeit + β2NetIncomeit + β3BKRPit + εit 
For variable definitions see Table 2. 
 
The approach used in the industrial sector is different from the industry presented 
before. Companies in this sector rely more on sale manipulation, observed until the year 
before the legal procedure for bankruptcy. Interestingly and consistently with general 
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findings, these practices seem not to occur the year before the beginning of the legal 
procedure, given the increase of the level of scrutiny from third parties or because of the 
lack of customers. During this particular period of time, entities overcome this problem 
manipulating production costs as ultimate attempt to make their financial statement 
looking better as indicated by a positive and significant coefficient β3 of model (3), 
estimated in t-1, with ABNPROD as dependent variable (β = 0.048; p-value = 0.034), 
which was instead not significant during the previous two years. 
Evidence related to firms operating in the services sector is presented in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Bankrupt firms and real earnings management (Services sector by year). 
Table reports only the coefficients of interest. 
 
  (A) (B) 
  ABNCFO ABNPROD 
 BKRP -0.183** 0.124*** 
Year -4  (0.104) (0.046) 
    
 Observations 196 196 
 R-squared 0.063 0.261 
 BKRP -0.129* 0.065** 
Year -3  (0.081) (0.030) 
    
 Observations 196 196 
 R-squared 0.037 0.400 
 BKRP -0.175** 0.083*** 
Year -2  (0.081) (0.030) 
    
 Observations 196 196 
 R-squared 0.183 0.354 
 BKRP 0.055 0.131*** 
Year -1  (0.069) (0.040) 
    
 Observations 196 196 
 R-squared 0.370 0.425 
 
Notes: 
P-values calculated from firm-level clustered standard errors which appear in parenthesis below the 
coefficient estimate. *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level or better.   
 
Regression models: 
Col. A: ABNCFOt = α + β1Sizeit + β2NetIncomeit + β3BKRPit + εit 
Col. B: ABNPRODt = α + β1Sizeit + β2NetIncomeit + β3BKRPit + εit 
For variable definitions see Table 2. 
 
Because costs and revenues for this kind of companies include a lot of intangible items 
which are tricky to check reliably, they have incentives to manipulate both these classes 
of accounts in order to alter the financial performance of the company. This evidence is 
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supported by our results. Indeed, sale manipulation is observed every year, with the 
exception, in accordance with our general findings and evidence from other sectors, of 
the year immediately before the beginning of the legal procedure for bankruptcy. The 
manipulation of production costs is quite important given the strong significance of the 
related coefficient that is always either at the 5% or at the 1% level. In addition, these 
practices are always observed through the period under investigation. It is worth also 
highlighting that the production cost manipulation is more significant than sale 
manipulation across the years observed.  
 
 
Our final analysis involves companies operating as wholesalers. Results are presented in 
Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Bankrupt firms and real earnings management (Wholesale sector by year). 
Table reports only the coefficients of interest. 
 
  (A) (B) 
  ABNCFO ABNPROD 
 BKRP -0.144*** -0.049 
Year -4  (0.047) (0.037) 
    
 Observations 122 122 
 R-squared 0.192 0.266 
 BKRP -0.086** -0.013 
Year -3  (0.051) (0.038) 
    
 Observations 122 122 
 R-squared 0.071 0.114 
 BKRP -0.037 -0.040 
Year -2  (0.043) (0.034) 
    
 Observations 122 122 
 R-squared 0.165 0.197 
 BKRP -0.052 -0.024 
Year -1  (0.046) (0.027) 
    
 Observations 122 122 
 R-squared 0.084 0.645 
 
Notes: 
P-values calculated from firm-level clustered standard errors which appear in parenthesis below the 
coefficient estimate. *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level or better.   
 
Regression models: 
Col. A: ABNCFOt = α + β1Sizeit + β2NetIncomeit + β3BKRPit + εit 
Col. B: ABNPRODt = α + β1Sizeit + β2NetIncomeit + β3BKRPit + εit 
For variable definitions see Table 2. 
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Accordingly with the structure of the sector, we consistently do not observe any sort of 
production cost manipulation given that firms in this sector – wholesale – does not 
present any (significant) aspect of production as their business is based on buying and 
selling goods without any (significant) physical transformation. On the other hand, we 
find evidence of sale manipulation which, in accordance with all the other sectors, stops 
while approaching the year of the actual bankruptcy. In this particular case, we do not 
observe sale manipulation from the second year preceding the legal bankruptcy 
procedure. A possible explanation could be the singular characteristics of this industry: 
the competition is very high and the value added is low; this makes even sale 
manipulation more difficult to achieve in comparison with other sectors. For example, it 
is very challenging to manipulate low selling price products especially when other 
companies may offer exactly the same item on the market. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper investigates real activities manipulation among bankrupt firms operating in 
Spain using a matched pair sample of healthy firms during the years preceding the 
bankruptcy. 
 
Findings support the evidence that managers of bankrupt firms use upwards earnings 
management through real activities manipulation during the years before the actual 
bankruptcy. In addition, using sale and production cost management proxies, not 
previously used jointly on this topic, our findings indicate that companies use a 
combination of sale and production cost manipulation in order to postpone the legal 
procedure. These practices start at least four years before the bankruptcy although sale 
manipulation stops the last year before distress. Furthermore, the methods used to 
manipulate earnings differ across industries and in relation to the number of years 
approaching the legal procedure with the interesting evidence that, close to the end of a 
company’s life, management stops using sale manipulation probably due to a closer 
monitoring from external bodies.  
 
Results of this study have several implications. On average, bankruptcy is not only a 
result of economic crisis but includes a certain degree of managers’ misbehaviours. 
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According to our results, this should be taking into account when the parts involved in 
the legal process analyse firms’ situation and future. Indeed, evidence indicates that 
managers of companies operating in a code law country manipulate real activities even 
if they are aware of the criminal implication this might have. This could be explained by 
the weak legal enforcement that does not effectively constrain managers’ 
misbehaviours. Findings might also attract the attention of monitoring bodies and 
auditors as they highlights the areas, in each industry, that need a closer monitoring in 
presence of any signal of financial distress or controversial management behaviours. For 
example, in the case of companies operating in wholesale sector, only sales need closer 
controls while production costs do not seem affected by any manipulation. Evidence 
then suggests that management uses the nature of the industry in which firms operate in 
order to locate areas that are easier to alter in order to inflate earnings during the years 
before the bankruptcy and, when it is possible, they use a combination of both sale and 
production cost manipulation. In addition, our results indicate that, close to the 
company’s end, managers struggle with an increase of the level of monitoring, distrust 
from stakeholders, at a point that they stop to manipulate transactions which involve 
third parties (such as customers) using sale manipulation. On the other hand, this does 
not discourage them to continuing using the level of production to improve company’s 
performance as the last desperate attempt to escape from filing for bankruptcy. Finally, 
evidence clearly indicates that all parties involved in the ‘preconcursal’ procedure may 
keep in mind that any decision taken on the basis of firms’ annual reports might be 
biased due to manipulated financial figures. 
 
The paper is not free from limitations. Findings are based on two proxies of real 
activities manipulation and we are aware that there are many other earnings 
management proxies that could be taken into account. Furthermore, although our results 
are in line with previous research based on different institutional settings, the 
generalization of our results is difficult given the detailed analysis of only one country. 
We believe that our findings might be extended to other similar code law European 
countries such as France, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal, anyway 
future research using other realities with our similar institutional setting or comparison 
between different legal environments should be needed to corroborate them and also to 
analyse factors that could affect management misbehaviours. Finally, the results may be 
conditioned by the economic crisis observed by EU at the time this paper has been 
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prepared. The investigation of earnings manipulation practices conditional to the 
outcomes of the bankruptcy procedure (for example, reorganization versus liquidation) 
could be an interesting topic on this research line. 
 
                                                            
NOTES: 
i Information about GDP has been retrieved from the International Monetary Fund website www.imf.org. 
ii In general, we use the term ‘bankruptcy’ to refer to firm failure in a legal process. ‘Failure’, 
‘Insolvency’ and ‘bankruptcy’ are used with the same sense throughout this paper. 
iii Official bankruptcy statistics illustrate that only one in ten Spanish companies with financial problems 
survives (NSI, 2010). 
iv Art. 261 states that ‘whoever were to knowingly present false data concerning his accounting status 
during insolvency proceedings, in order to unduly obtain a declaration thereof, shall be punished with a 
sentence of imprisonment from one to two years and a fine from six to twelve months’. 
v Because the long time the Court needs to reach a decision, it is not uncommon that also a reorganization 
agreement could end in liquidation. 
vi Individual firms have been excluded from the analysis. In our sample there was only one in the 
bankruptcy webpage during the period of sample extraction. 
vii To match a company on the basis of the industry, we use the first two digits of the NACE Rev. 1 sector 
classification.  
viii We indentify two legal forms: ‘corporation’ and ‘limited companies’. 
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